79-1148

Supreme Court, U. S.
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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. No. ~~78-1631~~

SETH O. SPARKS,

Petitioner
~~Defendant-Appellant~~,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Charles F. Sandoval (R.E. Thompson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee

Seth O. Sparks
Pro Se

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1979

_____

No.

_____

Seth O. Sparks,

Petitioner,

vs.

The United States of America

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioner, Seth O. Sparks, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the opinion and judgement of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rendered in these proceedings on November 23, 1979.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, as yet unreported, appears at Appendix A, infra, pages 15 - 22, The opinion of the Dederal District Court for the District of New Mexico, is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit affirming the District Court judgment was entered on November 23, 1979 (Appendix A, infra, page 15). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner was a tax return preparer, who both prepared federal income tax returns and purchased, at a discount, the right to tax refunds. During an IRS agent stated to Petitioner, the IRS agent stated to Petitioner that he was investigating illegal aliens and further that Petitioner was under arrest. Subsequent to his arrest, Petitioner was forced to furnish handwriting exemplars to the Grand Jury. Later, at the time of trial, the Trial Court refused to ask certain voir dire questions relating to possible racial prejudice on the part of the prospective jurors, even though requested to do so by Petitioner's attorneys. The questions thereby arising are:

1. Whether the actions of the Internal Revenue Service Agent, in the course of his investigation, violated Petitioner's Constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, against self-incriminations and right to counsel.

2. Whether the requirement that Petitioner furnish handwriting exemplar to the Grand Jury violates against self-incrimination and further violates public policy concerning the Grand Jury.

3. Whether the Trial Court's refusal to propound voir dire questions relating to racial prejudice violated Petitioner's Constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury of his peers.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

I. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT IV.

"The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, ...".

II. CONSTITUTIONAL FO THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT V.

"...nor shall (any person) be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...".

III. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT VI.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the acused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

IV. 18 U.S.C. 287

"Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer... of the United States, or to any department of agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent ...".

V. 18 U.S.C. 495

"Whoever falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits any...writing, for the purpose of retaining or receiving, or enabling any other person, to either directly or indirectly, obtain or receive from the United States... any sume of money; or whoever utters or publishes as true any such false, forged, altered or counterfeited writing, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited, shall be quilty under this section."

VI. 18 U.S.C. 641

"Whoever embezzles, steals, purloin or knowling converts to his own use...any records, vouchers, money, or thing of value of the United States; or whoever receives, conceals or retains the same with intent to convert it to use of gain, knowing it to be embezzled, stolen, prulonned or converted shall be quilty under this section."

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Privacy Act of 1974 found in your federal income tax forms says:

The Privact Act of 1974 says that each federal agency that asks you for information must tell you:

A. Its legal right to ask for the information and whether the law says you must give it.

B. What a major purposes the agency has in asking for it, and how it will be used.

C. What could happen if the agency does not receive it.

Rule (19 B) of the Supreme Court:

B. Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided an important state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law; or has decided an improtant question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decision of this court; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power supervision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Alleged Offenses:

The Petitioner was self-employed in Hobbs, New Mexico, as an income tax preparer. Petitioner, as a part of his business, was also a "discounter", and as such would buy an individual's right to his tax refund. This would allow the individual taxpayer to have cash immediately, and the party would not be required to wait for hos or her Government refund check. Petitioner would receive an oral assignment of the individual's right to his or her check and/or a written power of attorney, so that the Defendant could cash the refund check when received.

Petitioner began requiring written powers of attorney only after he had discussed procedure with an Internal Revenue Agent. He was informed at that time that the oral assignment of right was not sufficient, but his business and porcedures were acceptable to the IRS if he would acquire written powers of attorney.

B. Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service:

The Petitioner was contacted by a special agent of the Internal Revneue Service, who confiscated Petitioner's records incident to his tax preparer business. When taking Petitioner's records, the agent misled Petitioner as to his purpose in taking the records by stating that the

Agent was investigating illegal aliens. At no time was the Petitioner aware of the fact that his business operation or himself personally, was being investigated. The Petitioner was told of his right to have an attorney appointed for him by the Court if he could not afford one, and that he could confer with this attorney before any questioning.

C. Grand Jury Investigation:

The Petitioner was required by Order of Judge Edwin L. Mechem to furnish handwriting exemplars to the Grand Jury.

The Grand Jury then returned an indictment on April 5, 1978, which included 19 counts against the Petitioner, including three counts of forging U.S. Treasury checks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 495; three counts of theft of Governmental property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 495; three counts of theft of Govermental property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641; four counts of false claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C.287; nine counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206 (2)

D. Trial Proceedings:

Petitioner's attorneys requested certain voir dire questions to be asked by the Trial Court. These questions related to possible racial prejudice on the part of the prospective jurors. The Trial Court refused to ask these or any

questions relating to racial prejudice.

On June 1, 1978, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to one count of forging a United States Treasury check, the true payee of which was Margaret Rogers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 495, one count of theft of Government property incident to the return prepared for Margaret Rogers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641, and two counts of false claims incident to those returns prepared for Margaret Rogers and Roberto Hernandez, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 287. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to all other counts (the remaining fifteen counts) contained in the indictment.

It should be noted that Margaret Rogers and Roberto Hernandez are "non-black victims". It should be further noted that Petitioner was acquitted as to all counts dealing with "black victims." Also, Petitioner himself is black.

REASONS FOR GRANDING THE WRIT

1. The decision below conflicts with the Court's ruling in Ristaino vs. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976), and the preceedings cases on which Ristaino is based.

This Court, in Alridge vs. U.S., 283 U.S. 308 (1931), and Ham vs. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), held that voir dire inquiry into possible racial prejudice was an issue of Constitutional stature.

> "The inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its Constitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Alridge and the numerous state cases upon which it relies, and from a principal purpose as well as from the language of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment." Ham, Supra, at 528.

This Court's ruling in Ristaino, supra, somewhat limited the ruling in Ham, supra, and held that the need to question veniremen specifically about recial prejudice did not rise to Constitutional dimensions in every case. The Court held that the need was still of Constitutional stature in those cases were racial prejudice was likely, however.

This Court, in Ristaino, supra, did admonish, however, the Trial Court to inquire as to racial prejudice even in those cases where the need is not Constitutionally protected.

> "The wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the Defendant." Ristaino, supra, Footnote 9, page 597.

The Trial Court is this cause disregarded the Supreme Court's admonition, and further Petitioner's attorney at the Trial Court did request a number of questions relating to racial prejudice.

In an attempt to interpret the Supreme Court's holding in Ristaino, supra, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Stated,

> "Of course a Federal Court does have a non-Constitutional duty to inquire as to possible racial bias on the jury panel when the Defendant is a member of a racial minority group. (Emphasis by the Court) U.S. vs. Bell 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir., 1978).

In fact, in Federal prosecutions following Alridge, supra, the Trial Judge has been required by the reviewing courts, when requested, to inquire regarding racial prejudice of the veniremen when the Defendant is black. U. S. vs. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir., 1972); U.S. vs. Johnson, 527 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir., 1975); U.S. vs. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (3rd Cir., 1973); U. S. vs. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir., 1971).

The state courts have also attempted to follow the Supreme Court's holdings in Ristaino, supra, but have apparently had some difficulty in so doing. Justice Levin, in his dissenting opinion, in People v. Harrell, 247 N.W. 2d 829, 833 (1976), stated:

> "We would hope that where there are significant racial overtones, probing questions are necessary to enable a litigant to exercise intelligently his rights of

> chalenge and that the refusal to ask such questions is an abuse of the Judge's discretion to control voir dire examination."

Apparently, the Federal District Court of New Mexico, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagree in their interpretation of Ristaino, supra, with the Courts cited above, in cases that the Trial Court has a duty to inquire as to whether the veniremen are racially prejudiced.

This Court should grant certiorari tothe Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit to insure uniformity between the lower courts with its decision in Ristaino, supra, and to clarify the Trial Court's duty in inquiring as to possible veniremen racial prejudice and the consequences of failing to do so.

2. The Prosecutorial Use of the Grand Jury Violates Petitioner's Constitutional Guarantees Against Self-Incrimination And is also against Public Policy, And Constitutional Policy concerning The Grand Jury:

The decisions of Judge Mechem, the Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that the Grand Jury could require Petitioner to furnish handwriting exemplars required the finding that the Grand Jury is not subject to Constitutional limitations which protect the individual from

unreasonable searches and seizures and from self-incrimination. As Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall state in their dissenting opinion in U.S. vs. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1972) to accept that position is to breach the Constitution of the United States and over 200 years of American jurispudence.

Allowing the prosecutor and police, through the Grand Jury, to compel incriminating statements and obtain incriminating pieces of evidence as in the instant case, would

> "...serve only to encourage prosecutorial exploitation of the Grand Jury process, at the expense of both individual liberty and the traditional neutrality of the Grand Jury. Thus, if the Grand Jury may summon criminal suspects for such purposes without complying with the Fourth Amendment, it will obviously present an attractive investigative tool to prosecutor and police." Mara, supra, at 47 (Marshall dissenting).

Justice Douglas described the result of allowing the Grand Jury to breach Constitutional rights in his dissenting opinion, in Mara, supra, at page 29:

> "Are we to stand still and watch the prosecution evade its own Constitution restriction on its

> powers by turning the Grand Jury into its agent? Are we to allow the Government to usurp certain powers granted to the people by the Magna Carta and codified into our Constitution? That will be the result of the majority opinion unless we continue to apply to the Grand Jury the protection of the Fourth Amendment."

The Grand Jury has already become a tool for the prosecutor, as evidenced by Judge William Campbell's statement at 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972).

> "This great institution (the Grand Jury) of the past has long ceased to be the guardian of the people for which prupose is created at Runnymede. Today it is but a convenient tool for the prosecutor..."

This Court's majority opinion in Mara,supara, allows the prosecution or the police to obtain incriminating evidence and to compel incriminating statements by the accused under the guise of the Grand Jury and insofar as it does so, invalidates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

3. Petitioner's Constitutional Rights as Guaranteed by the Fourth Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution Were Violated By the Government Agents In Their Investigation.

This Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) held that a Defend dants conviction must be reversed if it is based on testimonial evidence recieved from the acussed if the acussed's Constitutional rights were not explained to him prior to the confession.

This Court, in Miranda, supra, required that law enforcement agents explain to an accused that he has the right to remain silent, that anything the accused says can and will be used against him in a Court of law, and that the acussed has the right to consult with an attorney, either retained or appointed, prior to and during the interrogation.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in its opinion, states that the Petitioner was not in custody at the time he was interrogated, so a "non-custodial Miranda warning" is all that is required. The "non-custodial Miranda warning" differs from the traditional Miranda warning only in that the acussed is not instructed that if he cannot afford an attorney, he has the right to an appointed attorney. What this differentiation means, in reality, is that a person who can afford an attorney can have a lawyer with him when he is being interrogated in a non-custodial situation, however, a poorer person, or an indigent who cannot afford an attorney is effectively precluded from being represented by an attorney under these circumstances. Thus, an indigent's Constitutional right to be represented by an attorney during questioning is conditioned on his wealth

and thus violated. This results in a complete disagreement with this Court's ruling in Miranda, supra, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States in that preclaudes equal protection under the laws, and the conviction is not based on due process of law.

Further, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit misapplied this Court's ruling in Miranda, supra, in that they implied their decision would be different, with respect to the Miranda warning, if the Petitioner had been in custody at the time of the questioning. This Court held in Miranda, supra, at pages, 444, 445, 467, 477 and 478 that an accused's privilege against self-incrimination is imperiled and thus the warning must be given when one is "depriof his freedom of action in any significant way".

This Court also held in Orozco vs. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) that the warnings were required prior to interrogating a suspect in his own bedroom if it appears to the acused that he is not free to go where he pleases.

The Seventh Circuit, in its decision in U.S. v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301, 304 (7th Cir., 1974), interpreted this Court's Miranda holding in even stronger terms stating:

> "The application of Miranda does not turn on such a simple axis as whether or not the suspect is in

custody when he is being questioned"

For the above reason, Miranda warnings were required to be given to the Petitioner before his interrogation, and only some of those warinins were actually given. Thus, the Petetioner's Constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and this Court's holding in Miranda, supra, were breached in the investigation of the Petitioner.

RULE (19 B)

E. The charges are unreal the Petitioner stoll nothing from Rogers or Hernandez. The Petetioner processed W-2 forms that was sold to him by person believed to be the rightful owners

The Petitioner is one of many dis-discounters including the largest in the world - IRS, Master Charge Visa, American Express ect. That have unknowingly processed stolen or conterfiet instruments and the one that's quilty is seldom caught. Hundreds of millions are lost yearly.

A jury is the same as a computer. Dumb to all the facts of a case. All data is fed into to the computer. After they are programmed. It is the duty of the Court or operator to key the computer or jury on how to computer the program fed to them.

The court failed to give directions to the Jury if forgery was involved to choose the party unknown or the petitioner. It was clearly proved that the petitioner had no means to get the W-2 form to process but through Hernandez or Rogers of some one close to them that had access to their mail.

The petitioner all so operated a service station and had extensive dealing with discount instruments. He processed

thousands of government "credit cards", Visa, Master charge, all types of gas cards.

The card was honored not the person. The Petitioner saw thousand of travelers once in a life time and could not identify a single one six or eight months later, or even a day. A few stolen and revoked cards was received by the Petetioner but never was he as an agent of the company alerted or prosecutef for the forgery of a unknown.

Now why change and find the Petitioner of some unknown person gain?

The Petitioner pleads with the Supreme Court to rule him right or rule the government and all other discounters wrong for processing instrument assumed right.

EXPENMENT

Give one of your credit cards to one of your friends or your butler or yard boy. Send him to 5 or more places to buy with that card. Observe that the clerks don't look at the man they look only at the card. Come back 24 hours later and ask for a description of the one that used the card for the past experience, not one could give a description of the party, then decide who should get prosecuted.

Violation in the act of Congress(1974) He deceived the Petetioner stating that he was investigating aliens therefore violating the act of Congress.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the judgement and opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

SETH O. SPARKS
P. O. Box 1564
Hobbs, N.M. 88240

PRO SE

NOT FOR ROUTINE PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. No. 78-1631

SETH O. SPARKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. Crim. No. 78-95)

Charles F. Sandoval (R.E. Thompson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Danoff for Defendant-Appellant.

Bebore McWILLIAMS, BREITENSTEIN and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

After a jury trial, defendant-appellant was found guilty of forgery of a United States Treasury check, 18 U.S.C. §495, theft of government property, 18 U.S.C. §641, and presentation of a false claim, 18 U.S.C. § 287. On this appeal he attacts the jury selection, refusal to supress statements by him to an IRS agent, admission of handwriting examplers, and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

Defendant was a tax return preparer who both prepared federal income tax returns and purchased at a discount the right to tax refunds. He carried on these activities in Hobbs, New Mexico. Three counts on which defendant was convicted related to Margaret Rogers. Rogers' W-2 Form was mailed by her employer to her Hobbs address. She had moved to Gallup, New Mexico, and did not receive it. At her request a new W-2 form was sent to her in Gallup. A tax consultant there prepared a return for her which she filed. She testified that she had never met defendant, and had not authorized him to sign a return for her or to receive her refund.

The other count related to Roberto Hernandez and presented facts similar to those pertaining to Rogers. Hernandez did not receive his W-2 form and his return was prepared by another consultant. He stated that he did not know defendant and had not authorized defendant to

to prepare a return for him.

Defendant says that the voir dire examination did not protect his rights adequately because of the failure of the court to ask requested questions relating to race. Defendant is black. The record does not clearly show the race of Rogers or Hernandez. Defendant did not object to the voir dire, and it may be that his claims come too late. See United States v. Vecchiarello, D. C. Cir., 536 F.2d 420, 423. In the circumstances presented, we consider the issue on its merits.

In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589, 596-598, the Court held that absent circumstances similar to those in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, examination of prospective jurors with regard to racial prejudice is not constitutionally required. Defendant relies on a footnote in Ristaino, Id. at 597, N. 9, which comments on a nonconstitutional duty to propound appropriate questions relating to racial prejudice. In United States v. Polk, 10 Cor., 550 F.2d 1265, 1267, cert. denied 434 U.S. 838, we recognize Ristaino footnote 9 and pointed out that Ristaino involved a black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white man, whereas Polk was concerned with a nonviolent crime have no racial overtones. The same is true and the instant case. Viewed in its entirety the voir dire was fair to the defendant and well within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1267. Defendant's claim has no merit.

Over a six-month period an IRS Agent interviewed defendant several times. Defendant argues that statements made by him to the agent should have been

On his first visit the agent gave the defendant a noncustodial Miranda warning. This type of warning omits the advise that the person interrogated has the right to appointed counsel. Defendant relies on United States v. Dickerson, 7 Cir., 431 F.2d 1111, but that the case was specifically overruled by United States v. Fitzgerald, 7 Cir., 545 F. 2d 578, 581, because of the decision in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, approving a noncustodial interrogation. See also United States v. Lewis, 6 Cir., 556 F.2d 446, 448-449, cert. denied 434 U.S. 863. Although defendant says that the agent told him that he was not in custody. He was not handcuffed ant at least four interviews took place over the six-month period with the defendant and the agent making at least one trip in seperate cars.

Defendant argues that the agent obtained statements and documents by guile and deceit. We have recognized that Fourth Amendment protections can be violated "by guile as well as by force." United States v. Oakes, 10 Cir., 564 F.2d 384, 386, cert. denied 435 U.S. 926. Defendant testified that the agent told him that he, the agent was investigating "illegal aliens." The agent testified that he told defendant that he was investigating possible criminal violations of the tax laws. Defendant did not deny this statement of the agent. The record fails to show affirmative misrepresentations by the agent. See United States v. Prudden, 5 Cir., 424 F.2d 1021, 1033, cert. denied 400 U.S. 831. Defendant's

statements were made, and the documents surrendered, voluntarily and without duress and coercion. They were properly received. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-249. See also United States v. Shields, 10 Cir., 573 F.2d 18, 22-23.

Defendant urges the court erred in requiring him to furnish handwriting exemplars. The decision are against him. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-267, holds that the furnishing of such an exemplar does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21-22, holds that such action does not violate the Fourth Amendment We followed Mara in United States v. Blakney, 10 Cir., 581 F.2d 1389, 1390. Defendant emphashzes the dissent of Justice Marshall in Mara, 410 U.S. at 31, and asks us to reconsider Blakney. We decline to do so. The court properly required defendant to furnish the handwriting exemplars.

At the conclusion of the government's case defendant moved to dismiss the indicment because of the lack of proof of the required specific intent. We consider the motion as one for the judgement of acquittal. After the court denied the motion, the defense presented evidence including the testimony of the defendant. The government contends that the defense failure to renew the motion at the close of all evidence amounts to a waiver and precludes consideration of evidence sufficiency at this time. In United States v. Lopez, 10 Cir., 576 F.2d 840, 842-843, we recognized the waiver or preclusion rule and noted that it had been criticized and attacked. No necessity for consideration of the rule exists in the case at bar beacuse we are convinced that substantial

evidence sustains the verdict. An appllate court does not weigh conflicting evidence or pass on the credibility of witness. United States v. Waltson, 10 Cir., 552 F.2d 1354, 1366, cert. denied 431 U.S. 959. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to ascertain whether the evidence, with reasonable inferences therefrom, suffices to sustain the verdict. United States v. McMahon, 10 Cir., 562 F.2d 1192, 1195.

Rogers testified that she had never met defendant, that her tax return was prepared by another, and that she did not authorize defendant to sign her refund check. Hernandez testified that another person prepared his return, that he gave no one permission to sign his return, and that he did not sell his W-2 form to defendant. Other evidence connected defendant with the returns. Defendant's testimony was contrary to the government's evidence. The decisive question on the counts relating to Rogers and Hernandez was credibility and the jury resolved that question against defendant. The evidence suffices to sustain the verdict.

Affirmed.

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
APR 15 1980
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

No. 79-1148

In the Supreme Court of the Unites States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

SETH O. SPARKS, Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARIA TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

SETH O. SPARKS
P. O. Box 1564
Hobbs, New Mexico 88240
505-393-5678

PRO SE

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

NO. 79-1148

SETH O. SPARKS, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRITE OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 20-25) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on November 23, 1979. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on December 26, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

ARGUMENT CONTINUED

The trial court, The court of appeals and the Solicitor General all maintain that the petitioner was at no time under legal arrest. The

petitioner concedes and accepts this ruling. The petitioner realizes now that he was mislead, deceived in believing that he was under arrest, and had to do what he said and do anything he wanted to do.

Since there was no legal arrest, there was no legal search. A search must be on way or the other, legal or illegal since legal is definantly out. The petitioner contends that he was false imprisioned by two armed men and robbed of all his private papers, auto title, insurance policys, discharge papers, records of death, bank statements and all the bills and vital papers of more than two hundred people.

The petitioner tried to stop them from taking records belonging to his clients and him self. The petitioner told them to leave the search was over. Trying to protect his personal papers the box fell and scattered them all over the floor. The officer demanded the petition to get off of the papers he was standing on and he got down on his hands and knees and gathered all of the records. The petitioner raised so much protest about the government men action, the agent promised to return everything in twenty days. Four years later those two days haven't come yet. The petitioner was false imprisoned more than fifteen hours in the six month period. While false imprisoned the petitioner was forced to accompany them to the bank and open his safe deposit box. Then examined and took notes on what was in my safe deposit box. The petitioner had to open a sealed will that belongs to his eighty seven year old mother that she had entrusted him with to protect the seal until her death.

Only after agent number two told him he was wrong that he would put the will down. Agent

one contended he was in his right to inspect anything he had anything to do with. Nov. 1970. To establish false imprisonment of which false arrest is integral part it is only necessary to prove that person be restrained of his liberty under probable imminence of force without any legal cause of justification therefor.--Marschall v. City of Carson, 464 P.2d 494. N.Y.A.D. 1971. Where claimant had been arrested without warrant, burden was on the state, in action for false arrest was justifiable under all the circumstances-DeBonis b. State, 325 N.Y.S. 2d 215, 37A.D.2878. Ill. 1973. PUrpose of Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is to assure that the decision as to whether there is probable cause to invade privacy of party to be searched is left to a neutral observer. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4.-People v. Nunn, 304 N.E.2d 81, 55 Ill.2d 344. La. 1976. Search conducted without warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable under Fourth Ammendment, subject only to few specifically established and well-delieated exceptions, one of which is search incident to lawful arrest. U.S.C.A. Con. Amend. 4.-State v. Gordon, 332 So.2d 262.

The petitioner further contends that the government agent showed no personal cause to his actions.

1. It took the government agent six a six month study of the material contact threatening investigate prying into the affairs and life of more than two hundred people, confidential business that they had left with the petitioner who was bound by ethics to keep confidential. The agent violated all these people civil rights causing them undo hardships by setting his self as a I.R.S. Agent. He deliberately caused these people to loose thousands of dollars that were rightfully theirs. He disallowed one mans 5 kids because he would not sign a affidavit incriminating the petitioner. He cut one families grand child

causing them to loose four hundred dollars earned income credit because they would not cooberate with him against the petitioner. The familys daughter testified in open court to his gastopo like actions toward her parents, none of this was denied by the agent.

After the government agent locked up a case what he thought would sent the petitioner to jail, he turned over his findings to the District Tax Court. They failed to see a strong enough case to prosecute. Months later the case was turned over to a higher court that had jurisdiction over the South West Division of the U.S. They failed to prosecute. In turn the case was turned to the U.S. Supreme Tax Court in Washington D.C.

They failed to find grounds for prosecution. The case was returned to the lower court for it to be desolved.

After two and a half years in tax courts all the way to Washing D.C. and no indictment.

Further proves the petition was false imprisoned by agents acting on their own to destroy the petitioner. R.I. 1971. Where plaintiff in action against police officer for false arrest presented no evidence on damages, plaintiff would be entitled only to nominal damages if officer's plea of justification was considered as admission of fact and sufficient to establish prima facie case of false arrest. Gen. Laws 1956,§12-7-1 Ahern v. Lynch, 283A.2d 263, 109 R.I. 218. Md. 1970. Arrest or detention without legal authority, with or without probable cause. will render arresting person liable for damages considered actual compensation for unlawful invasion of plaintiff's rights and injury to his person and feelings and if act is motivated by malice or

if there exists wantonness, jury may award punitive damages as punishment for wrong done and as example to others. --Great Alantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 261 A.2d 731 256 Md. 643. N.Y.A.D. 1974 Plaintiff who brought action for false arrest was entitled to recover all damages which reasonably resulted from false arrest. --Schanbarger v. Kellogg. 352 N.Y.S.2d 50. N.Y. Sup. 1970. The measure of damages for false imprisonment is such sum as will fairly and reasonable compensate the injured person for any injuries caused by the wrongful act, including any special pecuniary loss which is direct result of the false imprisonment--Sindle V. New York City Transit Authority, 316 N.Y.S.2d 657, 64 Misc.2d 993. 995. Ala.1973. Where there is no dispute about the facts, the Supreme Court may examine the record for a more complete understanding fo those features of the record which were treated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals--Nixon v. State, 286 So.2d 315, 291 Ala. 657, on remand 286 So.2d 317.

Instead of dropping the case the district attorney joined the government agent to farther fram the petitioner. No one in three years had filed or complained that they had been done wrong. The district attorney took it on his own to file charges with the treasury department for checks claiming stolen.

They filed for a Joe Lester Ward without the owners knowledge. The treasury department had collected the check back two years before from the petitioner.Because the agent denied credit for his dependent, filed for Roberto Hernandez Allen from old Mexico who hadn't been in the United States since January of 1976, who by 1979 had forgotten about that piece of paper he sold three years before.

A Grand Jury investigation was called to make his fram work. The district attorney and agent picketed thirteen or forteen dumb, scared, greedy people out of two hundred, and groomed them with answers for the Grand Jury, which consisted of one that was overheard asking another one, I wonder what they grow on them farms, that man is charging them so much tax on.

The district attorney got nineteen indictments in half a day after three courts studied the same case two years and found no cause to indict the petitioner.

The petitioner was framed. The District Attorney and government agent has committed the Watergate Act. Federal Rules 26,45,28 was violated by them The only difference in the Watergate and the district attorney and agents actions are at Watergate, agents broke, entered and stole documents. 1354 D.C.D.C. 73. Subpoenas were served on behalf of party and which would require personnal rectified publications to appear for deposition on inter alie, furnish all documents, photos and tapes related to the break in or other espionage operations June 17, 1972 through November 7, 1972 with broad range of commission officials and employes, persons connected with the party's presidential compain, FBI, Metropolitan Police were not uneasonable broad or opposive Federal Rules 26,45,28. U.S.C.A.-Democratic Nat. Committe V. McCord 356 F. Supp. 1354.

The district attorney framed the petitioner, the agent false imprisoned the petitioner and armed robbed him of his records to do the same as agents was doing for the president.

Most highest honored judges of our fair land stood up against the president of the U.S. for

doing wrong. I pray that you want let so unjust a thing happen to a poor soul that has worked for sixty five years to make a honest living not a life of crime.

The Court of Appeals stated they would go along with the Judges decision. They did not know that the Judge wanted to aquit the defendant. The forman of the jury contacted the Judge and ask could they rule on oral consent, the Judge when told the jury that they could not That there is no such thing as oral consent.

These instructions were not given in open court and not in the presnets of the Defendant.

A Clovis man convicted on a first-degree murder charge has won a new trial in his appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court. The Court ruled Wednesday that the presiding judge improperly communicated with the jury.

Clifford Leo McCarter was convicted in Curry County December 15, 1978 in the death of Luis R. Romero, also of Clovis.

In its decision, the Supreme Court said the court record failed to show substantial evidence that the verdict was not affected by the communications with the jury.

The forman erred when he revealed the split decision of the jury before a unanimous verdict was reached. And Nieves erred when he instructed the jury it must deliberate further, the court said.

Ruling Handed down after Writ was filed Bar Bulletin January 24 Volum 19. No. 4.

CONCLUSION

1. The district attorney filed a case in Federal

Court over two years after the statue of limitations was up.

2. After a search and seizure if you don't get enough evidence for a indictment in a normal amount of time that the case is not to be presented to a grand jury, double jeporady is involved.

3. The only grounds the government is basing their agrument on is their version or Miranda Warning.

4, The government has no case, due to the confusion and complexibility of the Miranda Warning. Congress stepped forward and pulled the teeth of the Miranda Act by passing the Privacy Act of 1974. Refer to page five of the petitioners original brief.

5. The Judge errored.

6. The Forman of the jury errored.

Respectfully submitted,

SETH O. SPARKS
P. O. Box 1564
Hobbs, New Mexico 88240
505-393-5678

PRO SE

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

SETH O. SPARKS, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

PHILIP B. HEYMANN
Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM C. BROWN
JOAN M. AZRACK
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

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OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 20-25) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on November 23, 1979. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on December 26, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether petitioner was deprived of a fair trial because the trial judge did not question the prospective jurors concerning racial prejudice.

2. Whether certain evidence provided by petitioner in noncustodial interviews with Internal Revenue Service agents should have been suppressed because he was not given full *Miranda* warnings.

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, petitioner was convicted of forging a United States Treasury check, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 495; stealing government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641; and presenting false claims against the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 287. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years' imprisonment on each count. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 20-25).

Petitioner was an income tax adviser and tax refund discounter in Hobbs, New Mexico. The evidence at trial showed that on two occasions petitioner filed income tax returns using another person's name and W-2 form but his own address in order to obtain the refund checks. One of the checks was mailed to petitioner, who endorsed it and deposited it in his own account. In each case, the taxpayer testified that he had not received his W-2 form, that he had never met petitioner, and that he had not authorized petitioner to file a tax return on his behalf or to collect the refund check (Pet. 21-22, 25).

ARGUMENT

1. Prior to jury selection, petitioner submitted several proposed voir dire questions to the trial judge concerning the possible racial prejudice of the prospective jurors. Although petitioner does not contend that any juror was in fact biased against him, he argues (Pet. 8-11) that the

district court's failure to ask these questions denied him a fair trial. Petitioner never objected to the court's voir dire or the jury panel that was selected, however, and in such circumstances petitioner must be deemed to have waived his claim. See, *e.g.*, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f); *United States* v. *Blosvern*, 514 F. 2d 387, 388-389 (9th Cir. 1975); *United States* v. *Walker*, 491 F. 2d 236, 239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). See also *Shotwell Manufacturing Co.* v. *United States*, 371 U.S. 341, 362 (1963); *Frazier* v. *United States*, 335 U.S. 497, 503 (1948). Otherwise, defendants could use the voir dire to set a "trap for an unwary judge." The defendant would simply propose various voir dire questions and then, if the trial judge failed to ask all of the questions, he would claim reversible error on appeal, even though the trial judge did not have a timely opportunity to avoid such error. *United States* v. *Blosvern*, *supra*, 514 F. 2d at 389.

In any event, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the voir dire in this case did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial (Pet. App. 22). The trial court, which is vested with broad discretion in conducting the voir dire (see, *e.g.*, *Ristaino* v. *Ross*, 424 U.S. 589, 594-595 (1976); *Ham* v. *South Carolina* 409 U.S. 524, 527-528 (1973)), repeatedly asked the jurors whether "you have any prejudices in this kind of a case" and whether there is "any reason why you couldn't sit as fair and impartial jurors and render a fair and impartial verdict between the government on the one hand, and the defendant on the other?" See Tr. 844, 850, 853, 855-856, 858, 860-861, 862-863, 864-865. Although we believe it would have been better practice for the court in addition to ask the questions proposed by petitioner (*Ristaino* v. *Ross*, *supra*, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9; *United States* v. *Walker*, *supra*, 491 F. 2d at 239), "[t]he

Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions posed during *voir dire* specifically directed to matters [such as racial bias] that conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him." *Ristaino* v. *Ross*, *supra*, 424 U.S. at 594. Here, as in *Ristaino*, there is no "constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be [impartial]." *Id.* at 596.

To be sure, the Court indicated in *Ristaino* that, as a matter of its supervisory power, it would have required the trial judge to propound appropriate questions to the jury concerning racial prejudice in the circumstances of that case. *Id.* at 597 n.9. But *Ristaino* involved a black defendant accused of committing violent crimes against a white victim. *Id.* at 590-591. Here, in contrast, petitioner was convicted of a non-violent crime and the victim was the government. The court of appeals therefore properly refused to overturn petitioner's convictions, particularly in light of his failure to make a proper objection. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Polk*, 550 F. 2d 1265 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 838 (1977); *United States* v. *Diggs*, 522 F. 2d 1310, 1317-1319 (D.C. Cir. 1975); *United States* v. *Walker*, *supra*, 491 F. 2d at 239. See also *United States* v. *Grant*, 494 F. 2d 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974) (voir dire harmless error).

As petitioner points out (Pet. 10), at least two courts of appeals have recently exercised their supervisory powers to require the trial judge to question jurors regarding racial bias whenever the defendant requests such a voir dire and regardless of the circumstances of the case. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Williams*, 612 F. 2d 735, 736-737 (3d Cir. 1979); *United States* v. *Bowles*, 574 F. 2d

970, 972-973 (8th Cir. 1978). See also *United States* v. *Booker*, 480 F. 2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973); *United States* v. *Gore*, 435 F. 2d 1110, 1112 (4th Cir. 1970); *Frasier* v. *United States*, 267 F. 2d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 1959). Although such a sweeping per se rule appears inconsistent with the tenor of this Court's analysis in *Ristaino* (see 424 U.S. at 596 n.8 & 597 n.9), we believe that this is an area in which a difference among the courts of appeals as to the exercise of their respective supervisory powers is tolerable and does not warrant this Court's review. Some courts of appeals find it convenient to adopt a per se rule, thereby obviating the need to review each claim of jury prejudice on a case-by-case basis. Others, like the court below, prefer to review each voir dire to ensure that each defendant has had a fair trial. The difference in approach simply involves preferences in matters of judicial administration and does not threaten the rights of criminal defendants to obtain a fair trial.

2. Petitioner further contends (Pet. 13-16) that certain statements and documents should have been suppressed because Internal Revenue Service agents did not properly inform him of his *Miranda* rights at several interviews. However, as the courts below found, these interviews occurred at petitioner's home and business under non-coercive circumstances (Pet. App. 22-24; Tr. 14-40). Moreover, the agents read petitioner the modified *Miranda* warnings expressly approved by this Court in *Beckwith* v. *United States*, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), and

petitioner thereafter signed a waiver of rights form (Tr. 14-15, 33-34). Accordingly, the district court correctly admitted the challenged evidence at trial.[1]

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

PHILIP B. HEYMANN
Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM C. BROWN
JOAN M. AZRAC'K
Attorneys

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[1]There is also no merit to petitioner's claim (Pet. 11-13) regarding the grand jury's request for a handwriting exemplar. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Euge*, No. 78-1453 (Feb. 20, 1980), slip op. 10-11; *United States* v. *Mara*, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); *Gilbert* v. *California*, 388 U.S. 263, 266-267 (1967).

DOJ-1980-03